

EDUCATION TOWARD VALUES

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Abstract: This article deals with different value systems from the perspective of their source, nature, and implementation, and with the link between education and values. The achievement of values is considered to be of the highest importance in human life. Ethical doctrines vary about the source of values – whether they are derived from human beings or received from external authority. This dispute about the nature of values creates different views concerning the education of values, about the role of the educational system in the acquisition of values, and about the impact of values on pupils, both theoretical and practical.

Introduction

Our interest in ethics stems from the impact that it has on human life, especially on its strong relationship to the material aspects of life, such as politics, economics, and social relations.

Ethical discourse can be divided into three levels: ethical judgments, which are made in the normal course of language; normative ethics, which attempts to introduce a methodical and comprehensive form for laws, rules and principles to justify first-level ethical judgments; and meta-ethics.¹ Values rationalise good and evil, and deal with the rules of human behaviour, deciding what it ought to be. They are a fundamental issue in the domains of theoretical ethics and meta-ethics. They can be both constructive and deconstructive at the same time, negating what exists (deconstructive) for what ought to be (constructive), a continual denial of reality in progression toward absolute good.

Values are thus the object of theoretical ethics; they try to sustain the rules of human conduct in accordance with ethical judgments of good and evil, which depend upon cultural contexts, whereas meta-ethics describes and discusses various philosophical theories of ethics.² In spite of differences in philosophical doctrines regarding the definition of values, most commonly agree on the existence of values and how they can be achieved. Also in spite of their differences, most ethical systems

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appear to have a common concern about ‘humanising’ life, about bringing human conduct into conformity with human ideals as much as possible.

Most philosophers consider values as absolute principles in themselves, but which at the same time are engaged with human behaviour, in order to provide human life with ethical guidance and goals. Education, therefore, plays a significant role in linking values and behaviour.³

This article aims to explore and analyse the issue of values by comparing different ethical doctrines. Some philosophical perspectives argue that value has an *a priori* existence in the human mind, while others claim that value is a human phenomenon that can be investigated by scientific methods. The Islamic theory argues that values exist innately within human beings, and the function of religion is to remind human beings about what qualities they innately possess. Controversial opinions reflect different views regarding the achievement of values in human life, as well as the relationship between human behaviour and values. Can values be achieved in reality? How do values influence behaviour? Does the obligation to preserve values limit human freedom and creativity?

Theories about Values

Scheler (1874–1928) claims that the ultimate independence of values with regard to things, goods, and states of affairs appears clearly in a number of facts. “We know of a stage in the grasping of values wherein the value of an object is already very clearly and evidentially given, apart from the givenness of the bearer of the value. This applies equally to physical and psychical realities. Clearly, neither the experience of values nor the degree of the adequation and the evidence depends in any way on the experience of the bearer of the values. A value precedes its object; it is the first ‘messenger’ of its particular nature. An object may be vague and unclear while its value is already distinct and clear.”⁴

According to Intuitionism the fundamental facts in ethics are known by intuition, that is, they are understood implicitly, without an intermediary, evidence, or argument. Moore argues: “If you ask me what is good? My answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the matter. Or if you ask me How is good to be defined? My answer is that it cannot be defined, and that is all I have to say about it.”⁵

However, the emotionalism argument is that ethical discourse must be described according to its goal terms. The basic use of ethical judgment is not to indicate facts; it is informative, but it aims to influence and change the listener’s attitude, and then his or her behaviour. Ethical words carry emotional meaning and, therefore, perform a dual role: Expression conveys the attitude of the speaker and has an impact on the attitudes of the recipient. Here, we deduce that ethical discourse is neither rational, nor argumentative, nor manipulative, but is a form of psychosocial pressure.⁶

Hare claims that the essential function of ethical discourse is not to influence, but to prescribe. "[...C]ommands, however much they may differ from statements, are like them in this, that they consist in telling someone something, not in seeking to influence him". He adds, "I may be merely prescribing for this particular occasion without any thought of there being a general principle for all occasions of this kind."⁷

Ethics is considered the essence of Islam. That means there is no religion without ethics, and no ethics without religion. Religion is the source of ethics; therefore, values in Islamic thought are articulated in a speculative and practical manner. This stems from thinking that moral conduct leads to theoretical ethics; therefore, Islam emphasises the mutual relationship between theory and practice, or saying and doing.

The form of ethical question that al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) seems to consider in this context may be presented as follows: We want to bring each act and attitude under a general rule, a judgment of normative value for a type of act or attitude, so that we may have for our guidance a steady system of such rules to cover all occasions. The sources of knowledge are independent reason and revelation.⁸

Islamic values are totalities and meanings that are distinctively embodied within man, but they are not absolute like numbers, for instance, because every man feels these meanings without the need for mental absoluteness. They are lamps that light the road of human behaviour. The sensing and recognition of these meanings, which a person deals with daily in connection with the laws of the time and the place, represent their actual and concrete existence.

The Qur'ān presents life issues as values, but the Muslim human being is responsible for implementation of these values in his life. It means that implementation is not uniform and constant for every place and time. It depends on the ability of Muslims for progress and creativity. For example in political issues, the Qur'ān mentions two verses that describe the type of regime in general: "who (conduct) their affairs by mutual Consultation" (42:38); "It is part of the Mercy of Allah that thou dost deal gently with them. Wert thou severe or harsh-hearted, they would have broken away from about thee: so pass over (their faults), and ask for (Allah's) forgiveness for them; and consult them in affairs (of moment). Then, when thou hast taken a decision, put thy trust in Allah" (3:159).

The two verses present the regime issue in general as values, but process and details as well as instruments and aims are dependent on Muslims' ability to accomplish the values of consultation in the reality.

So, we should not expect that life issues in Islam are constant but rather changing from one Muslim intellectual to another one, because it depends on the experience and point of view of the intellectual, and his ability to create the theoretical and practical epistemology, as well as to develop instruments through the light of values.

Therefore, the role of Muslims in this world is to apply the ideal values in reality. But these values are infinite and absolute; these values stand in opposition to limited reality. That means there is no constant form for Islamic education or philosophy. It must be in dynamic action in hope to arrive to values which requires query and creativity.

Sources of Values

Values vary according to differences among cultures and societies. When we ask what the origin of values is, we find different opinions: Some argue that human beings create values, while others believe that the origin of values is not human, but external, authority.

Most philosophers argue that humans produce values. Kant (1724–1804) argues that the Mind determines and dictates the moral code based on free will, which will remain free or independent as long as it obeys these dictates, and refuses the natural tendencies to happiness and pleasure: “[I]t is clear that all moral conceptions have their seat and origin completely *a priori* in the reason, and that, moreover, in the commonest reason just as truly as in that which is in the highest degree speculative.”⁹ “If the principles are completely *a priori*, free from everything empirical, and found exclusively in pure rational concepts and not at all in any other place, they should undertake this investigation as separate inquiry as practical philosophy or as pure metaphysics of morals.”¹⁰

According to Kant, reason is an independent and pure faculty in the human being; it is not influenced by any environmental agent. The question that arises here is, “Can we separate the mind from experience of totality?” Kant insists upon that separation and emphasises that the source of ethics is pure reason. “But [it is] also of the utmost practical importance to derive the concepts and laws of morals from pure reason and to present them pure and unmixed [...] moral laws should hold for every rational being as such, the principles must be derived from the universal concept of a rational being generally.”¹¹

It is clear that the mind about which Kant speaks is a stable mind that exists in all humanity, but if we consider the mind as a quality and activity that changes according to human experience, how can we in this case accept the idea of a collective Mind that is common to all humanity as a source for moral values?

Nietzsche (1844–1900) distinguishes between the agent, the act and those who benefit from the act. The core of *The Genealogy of Morals* contains the famous distinction between master and slave moralities. The master morality belongs to a dominant, warlike horde or race. It represents first and foremost their self-affirmation and joy in life. The good is whatever they believe belongs to them and to their conquering instincts.

In the slave morality, by contrast, the negative is of fundamental importance. The overpowered slave who rebels ideologically against his condition does so by inventing a series of distinctions by which to condemn his master as 'evil' and to affirm himself, not directly and spontaneously, but indirectly and 'reactively', as the one who does not engage in the evil the conquerors perpetrate.¹²

Unlike thinkers who imbue moral theories with an anthropological characteristic and connect it with other doctrines, Jean Pierre Chanjeau adopts an analysis whose basis is scientific knowledge and which relies objectively on scientific, neurological data, and which constitutes a basis for a more suitable discussion of metaphysical sources.¹³ Ross responds to this argument, saying: "Scientism, which claims to give solutions to all philosophical and human questions through science, actually constitutes a decisive obstacle by not establishing values for daily living, which are relevant for making moral conclusions regarding the basis for all data. When Scientism refers every significant item of knowledge to knowledge that stems from sciences, it camouflages the human quality or the nuclear value of the problems."¹⁴

The control necessitated by scientific research methodology in investigations of values causes it to lose sight of the attribute of the infinite, which is the significant attribute for values, because scientific methodology does not possess the tools to research absolute issues. It deals with empirical issues; absolute issues fall outside its research domain.

While Durkheim (1858–1917) believed that society is the source of values, he saw a social fact as any way of acting which is general throughout a given society, while at the same time existing in its own right, independent of its individual manifestations. Durkheim's view is clear: If a mode of behaviour whose existence is external to the individual consciousness becomes general, this can only be brought about by its being imposed upon individuals. Therefore, it is probably not inaccurate to conclude that Durkheim tended to see all social facts as moral facts.¹⁵

Obviously, Durkheim holds to a social perspective that neglects metaphysical aspects and their role in the acquisition of values; he indicates the influence of society on the individual behaviour, as a compelling authority. "By authority, we must understand that influence which imposes upon us any moral power that we acknowledge as superior to us. Because of this influence, we act in prescribed ways, not because the required conduct is attractive to us, nor because it is innate or acquired, but because there is something compelling in the authority dictating it."¹⁶

The consideration that "values are the learned products of environment"¹⁷ does not explain the existence of values common to different societies. Moreover, this approach neglects the metaphysical dimension of values as superior ideals and their capability to change reality.

The External Origin of Values

In general, religions hold that God is the origin of values; He defines what is good and evil. In Islam, the Sunnites and the Ash‘arites in general say of this doctrine, “The good and bad are from God and not mental.” Some Christian theologians have even claimed that the sincere human mind cannot distinguish between good and evil.

Against this absolute view, the Mu‘tazilites argue that good and bad are rational, and that God has decided what is evil and what is good, except for subjective reasons relating to acts and things in themselves. We find the same attitude in the rational Christians, especially in St Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) and Duns Scotus (1265–1308). This means that values have an objective presence; good is good in itself, because it has the characteristics of good by nature, and the role of the mind is to search for those qualities.¹⁸

Also, modern Muslim intellectuals believe that values come from God, not from mind, nor society; they are innate. This perspective shares the doctrine of rationalism by arguing for the prior existence of values, but sees the origin and existence of values in the divine rather than in the empirical.

Murtaḍā Muṭahharī (1919–1979) emphasises that moral origins are stable, spontaneous and common to all people at all times, and that these human values cannot have meaning, understanding or reality unless they are spontaneous and have roots and origins in man’s spontaneity. They are in themselves facts that man moves towards automatically, motivated by his spontaneity. His movement towards concrete ‘good’ is motivated by his concrete reality. In this case, we have the right to consider these values as facts that Man moves towards, pushed by his mental reality.¹⁹

Muḥammad Jawād Mughniyyah (1904–1979) opposes the consideration of the mind as the sole source of moral values, because Mind does not apprehend everything scientifically; he believes that the sources of moral obligation are revelation, inspiration and pure spontaneity. Religion and revelation provide power and support to this Mind. There is no doubt that this support makes the rules of the Mind stronger and more lasting.²⁰

Fazlur Rahman (1919–1988) says that values are meanings and superior ideals; human beings cannot establish this world by themselves, and Mind cannot conceive of it. The ideal world is of a different type, and since human nature is part of a material reality, it can create only in and of the real world.²¹ Therefore, according to Fazlur Rahman, humans must acquire these ideals, not by inquiry and rational study, but through transmitted religious knowledge, because the basic principle within religious knowledge is the definition of duty, unlike non-religious knowledge, whose principles are based on reality.²²

The Islamic vision is not satisfied with the knowledge of phenomena in the world, but tries to understand the different dimensions beyond these phenomena, and religious explanations of these phenomena must address the connections between them and their ethical dimensions.

The Qualities of Values

In his dialogue with Protagoras, Socrates argues that virtues can be learned as constant epistemological content, because the essence of an object lies within it, so that the judgment of things is derived from their essential, objective qualities. Conversely, Protagoras claims that man is the measure of everything. Humans judge the existence of things, and society decides what virtue is; therefore, virtue is relative and changeable, which means that education is a priority for transmitting values.

These differing perspectives about the learning of virtues reflect dissimilarity in logical thinking. Socrates' philosophy is based on the idea of pure mind, which means that value is objective and arrived at through knowledge, whereas Protagoras' thinking is based on the senses, so values are subjective and depend on consensus within a society.

The plurality of values is not contradicted by their transcendental quality, because this plurality takes, in reality, different forms across nations. These values can be relative and plural through acts of human freedom that connect them with the absolute. Also, the achievement of values in reality means a transition in their status from absolute to relative, and what we see, in reality, is various types of human behaviour, not the values themselves,

Consequently, the human experience of values can be described as one of relativity. Because human beings have different abilities and attain values to varying degrees, the controversy about their transcendence and relativity is just an expression of the *a priori* quality of values and their appearance after experience. Ricoeur's view is that moral meaning is located neither in a disembodied ego nor in broad social and historical conditions beyond the ego, but in an interpreting self that mediates these two.²³

According to the Islamic view, values inhere within human beings; they are innate, and accommodate to religious values. Values stand opposite to reality; they are ideal and see the world as it ought to be, but is not in reality, so that, in order to develop values, humans must liberate themselves from reality by returning to themselves. By this process, human beings progress toward values.

Therefore, values are absolute and relative, objective and subjective, idealistic and realistic. They are absolute in themselves as supreme ideals, but relative in their accomplishment in reality. Thus, values are not a part of reality nor its production, but are in contact with daily reality in order to change it.

The Achievement of Values

Researchers differ on how to achieve values in human reality. What is the standard that defines values? There are those who claim that values are determined through empirical knowledge; others argue that value in itself is infinite, that scientific methods are not fitting for metaphysical research.

Naturalism holds that an ethical statement is a factual statement. The meaning of ethical terms like 'good' and 'right' can therefore be determined by using the methods of science, by resorting to empirical investigation;²⁴ Dewey (1859–1952) also believed in the capacity of science to determine values: "One of Dewey's most adamant claims is that the methods of science have a role in the formation of morals and values."²⁵

According to this argument, values are a production of human experience, and their existence does not depend on metaphysical dimensions. That means they are relative and differ from one society to another; thus, they are a human phenomenon that is engaged through scientific methods.

Others argue that value is beyond all reality. For instance, Louis Lavelle claims that values represent a kind of reference to human effectiveness, which urges us to make them increasingly durable and prevent them from surrendering to any form or presence that might compromise or undermine them. This means that values are introduced into the human mind prior to subjectivity and material phenomena, causing humans to create themselves. That quality of value prompts human beings to confront the bounds of objective reality and overcome them, to deny the limits and proceed to what is beyond.²⁶

Crossing beyond boundaries through unlimited value means denying reality and aspiring to change it. This crossing is not defined or limited, but beyond every possible limit. So reality becomes dynamic and constantly changeable. This makes human behaviour a continuing evolution towards values. However, the absence of values from behaviour does not mean values do not exist; values represent our aspiration to change reality. Thus, we cannot understand concrete reality without the quest for utopia that is in human nature. However, dreaming by oneself is not enough. The dream must be shared, and more and more people have to believe that it is a possible dream. Only then will it begin to come true. We finally reach hope. We hope because we act ethically because we hope to develop a perfect society.²⁷

The plurality of the values in reality creates a multiplicity and relativity of values, methods, meanings and facts which contribute to creative human life and extend the limits of freedom. The diversity of human values encourages people to communicate and to know each other in order to convey their values and carry a humanitarian message – scientific or moral – to other cultures.

Duty is the most important value in Islamic education, because duty contributes to the commutation between individual and society. Also it empowers social solidarity, and social justice in the society. The Prophet says: “You find the Muslims in their mutual love and compassion, like one body, should any organ of it fall ill, the rest of the body will share in the fever and sleeplessness that ensues.” Doing one’s duty is produced from the ethical values inborn in the human being. So duty is not restricting the freedom of man, because it is coming from within the man, and is not imposed from abroad. Therefore, doing one’s duty arises from inner motivation, that is reconciled with religious guidance.

Education and Values

Education, the link between behaviour and values, is designed to refine behaviour and guide it toward values. *Behaviour*, in this sense, is a set of practical activities that humans carry out in daily life on both sensory and mental levels.

Morality is something that exists in embryonic form within every child – rather like intelligence – and education’s purpose is to encourage it to unfold to its fullest potential. Morality, in this view, is something that happens to one, so education then becomes a process of liberating human possibilities in an approved way.²⁸

The difference between a moral and a non-moral education corresponds to the distinction between the complete good on one hand and having goods on the other. What the proponents of the non-moral view of education in effect are proposing, although they doubtless do not realise it fully, is that colleges and universities offer their students a one-sided education designed only to enable them to acquire goods of various sorts. In this one-sided view of education, colleges and universities have no duty to provide students with an education designed to help them become good persons.²⁹

The task of education is to teach students how to set goals, as well as how to yearn for their achievement. Each goal must correlate to a certain value; that is, it must link each act of behaviour to a value, so that morality produces constant improvement. Science as well must be governed by morality, because the separation between science and ethics could bring destruction to all mankind. Any behaviour, action or reaction, is intended for a certain purpose; this means that the achievement of value must be linked to intention, behaviour and goals. It is not enough to associate values with goals; they must be associated with intention and means as well.

The most complex task for education is developing the ability to acquire values. Valuation involves learning to judge, according to some consistent criteria, the worth of ideas, activities, and other behaviours. Learning to value in a manner that bestows a sense of personal worth involves knowledge, the ability to comprehend, apply, analyse, and synthesise these into some personal schema or model of self.³⁰

Students ought to think and act ethically; ethics provides students with an extension possibility toward infinite values, so that students strive in a constant process of development. Therefore, education is *toward* values, not *on* values.

Morality is directly concerned with a certain range of actions: not only manifest behaviour, but the thoughts, attitudes, motives, feelings, and dispositions of the agent. As with any other human practice, concepts form a crucial part of morality.³¹

Education toward values promotes a critical spirit and creativity in students. In addition to the effort invested in realising values, innate values promote the spirit of initiative and creativity in students, construct the student's personality to engage in exchanges of mutual dependence with others, and create an innovative human life, providing tools to foster intellectual openness to the other, and to integrate into, and adapt to, a diverse world. The student with values rejects intolerance and cruelty based in religion, colour, or sex and is not shocked by the apparent contradiction between local and global citizenship and participation in humanity, the relative and absolute. Thus, the school is the place that qualifies the student to be a human being, one who believes in free exchange and is independent in his or her thinking and critical reading, and is creative and innovative.

Nietzsche's 'ought to be' blocks creation and innovation. And the highest man, as lawgiver of the future, should be free from 'ought to be' to be able to create new values. A man as he ought to be: this sounds to me just to be in bad taste. One can escape it, first, by selecting only those states in which one is free from emotion, and second, by grasping the insolence and stupidity of the attitude of mind: for to desire that something should be otherwise than it is means to desire that everything should be different – it involves a damaging criticism of the whole.³²

Duty is a discourse for the future and a denial of the present. If values are absolute, and what 'ought to be' is derived from them, this opens the door to liberate the person from the borders of the real world towards the infinite, and this in itself is an expansion of freedom, not a restraint upon it. There is no doubt that freedom is a necessary condition for creativity. 'I want' speaks from the present to the future, which means that the future derives from the present, and as the present is limited, this means that freedom is constrained by the limits of reality. It may also be that non-commitment has a negative impact on human life. Irving notes, "It is unwise to give people rights without at the same time imposing obligations – that rights without obligations lead to irresponsibility, just as obligations without rights lead to servility."³³

Kant recognises the impact of commitment to human freedom; it may limit human freedom and reduce the area of choice, and sometimes abolish it completely. But the sense of commitment issued by the free will legitimises itself. "This subjective element is the maxim that I ought to follow such a law even if it thwarts all my

inclinations.”³⁴ Because this duty, like duty in general, is prior to all experience, it lies in the idea of a reason which determines the will on *a priori* grounds.³⁵

Fazlur Rahman believes that values are natural to humans, and commitment to them gives humans the energy to exceed a limited reality. Human beings seek to achieve different purposes in their lives and strive to correlate each goal with a certain value. Value cannot issue from the same Instinct, as the source of realistic goals, then, cannot be a source of ideal values, and if this is so, it must originate from a source beyond instinct. Because ideal values contradict reality, then only innate ‘human nature, with which humans are created’, can be the source of values. Innate values are a set of optimal meanings deposited in the human spirit that envision a horizon that exceeds the capacity of reality, and makes humans aspire to achieve them in order to benefit from them – that is to say, innate values are practical values with a spiritual origin, while instinct is a behavioural fact with a material origin.³⁶

According to Fazlur Rahman, creativity results from the achievement of values based on duty, because duty, not rights, is the origin of noble qualities, and a nation is not concerned only with being polite to other nations, but politeness is the mystery of its existence, and the nation is a moral community.³⁷

Values, in the Islamic perspective, are linked with practical behaviour, because doing leads to ethics. Islam emphasises the importance of values and does not separate them from doing. We obviously can observe the correlation between doing and values in Islamic instruction. For example, the belief in values is usually mentioned in conjunction with good deeds in the Qur’ān (103:3): “Those who believe and do good deeds.” That means that each saying must be translated into practice, because in general human actions must have a beneficial purpose.

Islamic education represents the Islamic spirit in general, it aspires to construct the human being toward achievement of human values; the role of education to link between reality and values, it means reconciliation between theory and practice, saying or word and doing.

Islamic education aims for a balance between three levels: sense, mind and ethics, and promoting them by various educational methods. The ego’s progress is a continuous dynamic movement which assimilates the different aspects and stages, without negating any, the perceptive and the intellectual, thought and emotions, ideas and deeds are all integrated into the final aim of the ego.³⁸

At present, we are witnessing the emergence of a moral trend that calls for global ethics: “There is no civilisational obstacle against the possibility of global ethics. While these approaches (religions) also have merit in demonstrating a wider conception of global ethics in the narrow liberal model, they ignore the difficulty of cultural difference and naively suppose that one religious value system is translatable into another without self-problematisation.”³⁹ It is very important in an open world to create a shared human ethics, in order to guide the different relationships of

economic and political cultures and others that cut across the limits of regions and states. Counter to individual and community ethics, common values among people are possible in the era of globalisation, because people have shared, inborn values. Hans Küng (b. 1928) argues that “the idea of a ‘Universal civilisation’ means in a positive way a universality in the technological, economical, political and, as we hope, also in the ethical dimension. In this time of globalisation of markets, technologies and medias we need also the globalisation of ethics.”⁴⁰

Conclusion and Recommendations

In spite of differences among ethical doctrines, most philosophers believe in the importance of values for human life. The disputes involve identifying the source of values and how to achieve them in reality.

Most philosophers argue that the source of values is in the human being (*a priori* in the mind or society). The Islamic perspective holds that values have an innate existence, in addition to a religious origin, and being inborn, these values are humanistic. This controversy concerns our understanding of the relationship between human values and human behaviour.

The philosophical view claims that value is an absolute in itself, but is a relativistic achievement in reality. That means values have both metaphysical and empirical dimensions. Empirical (Dewey) and social (Durkheim) doctrines accept the relativity of values, but deny the metaphysical dimension.

On the other hand, absolutism in the Islamic view is intended to the infinite attribute of God. Humans have to strive toward ideal values by constantly upgrading their behaviour; the implementation of values depends on the ability of each individual or nation – in that sense, values are relative.

The logic of Islamic ethical reasoning is based on communication and on the integration of the mind, sense and values. This moral reasoning not only views causes and effects to understand phenomena, but looks beyond phenomena to develop values and signs related to them. This thinking produces a moral space, encompassing purpose, word, deed, means, goals and values within the unity of a dynamic actor, who strives for perfection through constant improvement and denies the limits of reality.

Philosophical logic is based on a rational explanation of reality, because mind and sense are restricted by the borders of the reality. Empirical research deals with sensory phenomena, and rationalism attempts to understand these phenomena using mental instruments, so that both doctrines deal with the real world.

- The role of education in the different doctrines is to give guidance. Through the application of logic, theory and practice, school is the best place for

education toward values, taught not as independent content, but as a matter of general practice – in thinking, in the curriculum and in the community of the school.

- Generally, moral education can overcome the apparent contradiction between the different poles, and expand the border toward broader horizons, by dismantling structures and existing rules, and creating what should be.
- Education toward values is necessary in a global era more than at any previous time, because communication and relationships among people cross borders and encompass politics, economy, culture and the arts, so that people need acceptable values which constitute a common ground for their relationships. These values could be more suitable than the values of citizenship that act as restrictions in certain nations. This means extending the borders of education from citizenship to human values.
- We can say that the Islamic concept of morality can contribute to the establishment of global ethics, because it has the theoretical side through the Qur'ān and the Prophet's *Sunnah*, as well as the practical experience throughout certain periods of Islamic history.

In closing, moral beings, according to the Islamic view, consider themselves part of human society. They seek to extend values to all, not restrict values to themselves. They strive to deliver values to benefit others and to be enjoyed by everyone. They believe in the importance of communication, mutual understanding and exchanges with others, based on dialogue and respect, not with the aim of imposing values by force and violence. They believe in the importance of the other and the ability of the other to produce values, and in the possibility of exchange between value systems.

Notes

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